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MARKET NORMS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
VALUES IN THE GOVERNMENT 
WORKPLACE* 
PAULINE T. KIM** 
The conventional wisdom that public employees enjoy greater 
rights by virtue of the Constitution may no longer hold true. In 
recent cases, the Supreme Court has analogized public and 
private employment, having the effect of eroding the speech and 
privacy rights of government employees. This Article critically 
examines this trend, arguing that reliance on an analogy to the 
private sector is mistaken because the arguments for giving 
private employers broad managerial discretion do not apply with 
the same force, or at all, to government employers. Rights-based 
arguments do not apply to government agencies, which are 
publicly funded to achieve publicly defined purposes and cannot 
assert independent rights to property or autonomy to avoid 
compliance with constitutional norms. Similarly, the claim that 
market pressures will control overreaching by private firms has 
little application. In the private sector, compensation structures 
and competition for corporate control help align the incentives of 
managers with the interests of the firm; however, those 
mechanisms are largely unavailable in the public sector. Instead, 
public accountability is key to ensuring that government 
managers act within the bounds set by the public’s interest. 
Because public employees stand in a unique position to observe 
improper government conduct, their constitutional speech and 
privacy rights should be interpreted not by reference to market 
norms, but with an eye to protecting the mechanisms of public 
accountability. 
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In January 2009, as President-elect Barack Obama was preparing 
to take office, a group of employees at the Federal Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) sent a letter to John Podesta, head of the 
presidential transition team. The letter, signed by nine scientists 
working for the agency, raised concerns about the review process for 
medical devices at the FDA.1 Specifically, it alleged that managers at 
the agency had ignored serious concerns about the safety and 
effectiveness of those devices and had ordered the physicians and 
scientists responsible for evaluating them to modify their expert 
evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations in order to facilitate 
approval and clear the devices for market.2 The letter warned that 
these practices threatened the health and safety of the American 
public and urged the new administration to make reform of the FDA 
a top priority.3 National news outlets reported on the letter and its 
allegations of misconduct and corruption at the agency.4 
 
 1. Letter from Physicians and Scientists, FDA, to John D. Podesta, Co-chairman, 
Presidential Transition Team (Jan. 7, 2009), http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage
/whistleblowers/documents/FDAwhistleblowers/letter2transitionteam.pdf [http://perma
.cc/L2BV-TW4N]. 
 2. The letter cited as one example the agency’s approval of mammography 
computer-aided detection devices despite flawed testing and a lack of clinical evidence of 
their effectiveness. Id. at 3. Post approval, agency decision-makers ignored evidence 
suggesting the devices were ineffective and potentially harmful. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Alicia Mundy & Jared A. Favole, FDA Scientists Ask Obama To 
Restructure Drug Agency, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2009, 10:50 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123142562104564381 [http://perma.cc/NRR5-P8RE (dark 
archive)]. 
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After the news reports appeared, managers at the FDA began 
secret surveillance of the electronic communications and computer 
activities of the employees who had signed the letter.5 Spyware 
installed on government-owned computers and networks used by the 
targeted employees allowed FDA officials to monitor all of their 
email communications, including emails sent and received through 
personal, password-protected services, such as Gmail, that were 
viewed on government equipment or otherwise passed through a 
government-owned network.6 The software also took screen shots of 
the targeted employees’ work computers, such that any information 
the employees viewed could be captured and retrieved later even if 
the employees themselves did not save the information.7 Through use 
of this surveillance software, the government allegedly captured some 
80,000 pages of computer documents over many months, including 
emails sent to or received from journalists, members of Congress and 
their staff, attorneys, and other agency scientists who shared similar 
concerns.8 The scope of the monitoring was so pervasive that it also 
captured the employees’ communications with family members, 
spouses, and partners, revealing personal medical and financial 
information.9 Several of the employees were eventually terminated by 
the agency.10 After the surveillance was publicly revealed, the 
targeted employees sued, alleging violations of their First and Fourth 
Amendment rights.11 
Imagine a similar scenario unfolding in a private firm. Several 
employees get together to raise concerns about perceived 
mismanagement or corruption, and their superiors retaliate against 
 
 5. The allegations regarding the FDA’s surveillance of the targeted employees are 
detailed in a complaint filed in federal court. See First Amended Complaint at 11, 16–17, 
Hardy v. Hamburg, 69 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 1:11-cv-01739-RLW); see also 
Halt Whistleblower Surveillance, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., 
http://www.whistleblowers.org
/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1345&Itemid=206	[http://perma.cc/37C4
-2QX8] (providing examples of the employees’ electronic communications, which were 
monitored as part of the surveillance program). 
 6. Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Vast F.D.A. Effort Tracked E-Mails of Its Scientists, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, at A1. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 50. 
 10. Editorial, The Spy Hunt for Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/23/opinion/the-spy-hunt-for-whistle-blowers.html 
[http://perma.cc/3B73-929P (dark archive)]. 
 11.  See First Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 50–51. The suit was dismissed by 
the district court on September 23, 2014, for lack of jurisdiction. See Hardy v. Hamburg, 69 
F. Supp. 3d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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them. One form of retaliation involves surreptitious surveillance of 
the employees’ electronic communications. Some employees are fired 
as a result of their complaints. The employees might claim that their 
rights of speech and privacy had been violated, but because they are 
employed by a private firm they would not be able to invoke First and 
Fourth Amendment protections as the FDA employees did. Instead, 
the availability of legal protection would be contingent on such 
factors as the state jurisdiction in which they work, whether their 
speech reported a violation of a specific type of statute, and what 
policies the employer had previously announced. Certain types of 
speech—for example, employee participation in public debate—
would likely not be protected at all. And if, like many private firms, 
the employer reserved the right to monitor employee 
communications, the employees would have a difficult time 
establishing that the surveillance violated their rights. 
Should the fact that the controversy at the FDA involved a 
government rather than private workplace make any difference to the 
legal outcome? The conventional wisdom is that public sector 
employees enjoy greater rights of speech and privacy than workers in 
the private sector because the Constitution restrains government 
employers.12 Public agencies cannot require their employees to swear 
loyalty oaths,13 fire them because of their expression,14 or subject their 
personal effects to intrusive searches unless those conditions are 
justified by the legitimate requirements of the job.15 Although these 
 
 12. See, e.g., Paul F. Gerhart, Employee Privacy Rights in the United States, 17 COMP. 
LAB. L.J. 175, 179 (1995) (“Inasmuch as free expression is protected by the First 
Amendment, public employees have greater latitude in this area than do private 
employees.”); Joseph R. Grodin, Constitutional Values in the Private Sector Workplace, 13 
INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 13, 19 (1991); Ian Holloway, The Constitutionalization of Employment 
Rights: A Comparative View, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 113, 118 (1993); Tara J. 
Radin & Patricia H. Wehane, The Public/Private Distinction and the Political Status of 
Employment, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 245, 247 (1996); Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace 
Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 278 (2012); Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices 
and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 
1453 (1982); Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment 
of Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689, 691–92 (1986); S. 
Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the 
Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 828 (1998) (“[P]ublic-sector employees enjoy far greater 
privacy rights than do private-sector employees.”). 
 13. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609–10 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 
U.S. 360, 366 (1964); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961); Wieman 
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). 
 14. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987); Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1968). 
 15. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721, 724–25 (1987); see also Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960) (finding unconstitutional a state statute requiring public 
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constitutional guarantees are far from absolute, they provide an 
important check on the government’s power to condition public 
employment on the relinquishment of employees’ constitutional 
rights. By contrast, constitutional restraints do not apply in the 
private sector,16 where employment relationships are largely governed 
by contract. Market norms dominate there, and most private 
employers have a great deal of discretion in shaping the terms and 
conditions of employment, including placing restrictions on their 
workers’ freedom to speak and requiring submission to searches or 
monitoring practices.17 
However, this conventional wisdom—that public employees 
enjoy greater rights by virtue of the Constitution—may no longer 
hold true. In part, this is because the patchwork of statutory 
protections covering private employees is growing.18 But 
significantly—and this is the central concern of this Article—
constitutional protections for government employees’ speech and 
privacy are eroding, a trend accompanied by explicit or implicit 
references to private sector norms. More specifically, the Supreme 
Court has increasingly relied on an analogy between public and 
private sector workers,19 suggesting that private employment is an 
appropriate reference point for evaluating public employees’ claims 
for constitutional protection. Because the market norms dominant in 
the private sector tend to reinforce broad managerial discretion, the 
effect of the analogy has been to put downward pressure on public 
employees’ constitutional speech and privacy rights. These trends 
 
school teachers to disclose every organization to which they had belonged or contributed); 
Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956) (protecting public employees’ 
exercise of their Fifth Amendment rights). 
 16. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982). 
 17. See, e.g., Petrovski v. Fed. Express Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (N.D. Ohio 
2002); McGarvey v. Key Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 211 P.3d 503, 508–09 (Wyo. 2009); Edmonson 
v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 741 (Idaho 2003); Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, 
Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. App. 1989). 
 18. See infra notes 38–45. See generally MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 952–72 (4th ed. 2013) (surveying sources of legal protection for 
employee privacy); NANCY M. MODESITT, JANIE F. SCHULMAN & DANIEL P. WESTMAN, 
WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE (3d ed. 2014) (collecting 
and describing protections for employee speech). 
 19. Although the focus of this Article is speech and privacy rights, the Court has made 
a similar move in other contexts. See, e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 
2488, 2505 (2011) (Petition Clause); Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 594 
(2008) (invoking the broad discretion that typically characterizes the private employer-
employee relationship in rejecting a “class-of-one” equal protection claim against a public 
employer). 
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have been noted critically by some scholars20 and applauded by 
others.21 
Ironically, the analogy was first pressed by employee advocates 
as a way of arguing for greater protections in the private sector.22 
They asserted that the threat to fundamental freedoms is much the 
same, whether the employer is public or private, and urged that 
constitutional values also be protected in the private workplace.23 At 
the time, the analogy was intended to bolster the rights of private 
employees by leveraging the greater rights afforded public employees 
under the Constitution. These arguments were part of a larger 
literature critical of the state action doctrine, which applies 
constitutional restraints to government actions, but not the actions of 
private entities. Critics have argued that the doctrine is inconsistently 
applied24 and conceptually incoherent,25 and these concerns have 
sharpened with the growing privatization of government functions.26 
 
 20. See, e.g., Secunda, supra note 12, at 281 (arguing that the Supreme Court, by 
taking cues from the private sector, has reduced public employees’ privacy rights); Adam 
Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the Privatization of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. 
L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2013) (criticizing the trend toward reducing the First Amendment rights of 
public employees to the level of private employees). Although I agree with Secunda and 
Shinar that the overall trend of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been to reduce 
public employees’ constitutional rights to privacy and speech, I believe that each of them 
overstates the degree of the decline. Secunda states that “post-Quon, public and private 
employees have been deemed to have the same level of workplace privacy rights,” 
Secunda, supra note 12, at 302, while Shinar asserts that “Garcetti	.	.	.	has brought 
constitutional protection close to its nineteenth-century level	.	.	.	.” Shinar, supra, at 6. In 
fact, in the lower federal courts, constitutional rights of privacy and speech continue to 
provide protection, albeit more limited in scope, for public sector employees. See, e.g., 
cases cited infra notes 113–19. 
 21. Scholars endorsing this trend have argued that the managerial prerogative of 
government employers justifies considerably narrowing, or even trumping, government 
employees’ constitutional rights. See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, The Constitutional Relevance 
of the Employer-Sovereign Relationship: Examining the Due Process Rights of Government 
Employees in Light of the Public Employee Speech Doctrine, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 797, 
816 (2007); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial 
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 60–65 (2008). 
 22. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 12, at 3–4, 14–15; Radin & Wehane, supra note 12, at 
247–49; Summers, supra note 12, at 691; Wilborn, supra note 12, at 828. 
 23. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 12, at 3; Summers, supra note 12, at 689–92. 
 24. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s 
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (“The whole thing has the flavor of a 
torchless search for a way out of a damp echoing cave.”); Gregory P. Magarian, The First 
Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime 
Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 129 (2004) (describing state action cases as 
“a bewildering series of unpredictable results” that seemingly turn on small factual 
differences). 
 25. See Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for “State Action” Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208, 209 (1957) (“[W]henever, and however, a 
state gives legal consequences to transactions between private persons there is a ‘state 
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While debates over the state action doctrine ask whether 
constitutional norms should be extended to restrain ostensibly private 
actors, this Article focuses on the converse phenomenon. It 
highlights—and critiques—a trend toward referencing private sector 
norms to interpret public employees’ constitutional rights of speech 
and privacy.27 This trend is part of a larger phenomenon—what Jon 
Michaels calls “the marketization of the bureaucracy.”28 He points out 
that in recent years public employees have confronted attacks on 
their collective bargaining rights, wages and benefit levels perceived 
to be “above-market,” and job-security protections, such that the 
public workplace “increasingly is made to resemble what we’d 
encounter in the private sector.”29 The phenomenon I analyze here—
the reliance on analogies to private sector workplaces in the 
constitutional cases—can be understood as one aspect of this broader 
trend of bringing market norms to bear on the government 
workplace.30 And to the extent I criticize that reliance here, my 
argument suggests some reasons for resisting the wholesale embrace 
of market norms in the public sector workplace. 
 
action.’	”); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1353–57 (1982); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State 
Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505 (1985) (arguing that nonstate actors may pose as great 
a threat to fundamental rights as the government); Robert L. Hale, Rights Under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 
LAW. GUILD REV. 627, 627–28 (1946) (same); Magarian, supra note 24, at 129–30 (same). 
 26. See, e.g., JODY FREEMAN & MARTHA MINOW, GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1–22 (2009); Matthew Diller, The 
Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1185–87 (2000); Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private 
Persons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 480 (2005); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (2003); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 1023, 1042–43 (2013); Mark H. Moore, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (2003); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 1165, 1165 (1999). 
 27. Other scholars have similarly begun to question the validity of a facile analogy 
between the public and private sectors. See Victoria Schwartz, Overcoming the Public-
Private Divide in Privacy Analogies, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 143, 148–50 (2015) (examining use 
of public/private analogies in determining whether an individual has a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy”); Shinar, supra note 20, at 1 (arguing that public employees are 
different from private employees such that they should have stronger First Amendment 
protections). 
 28. Michaels, supra note 26, at 1042. 
 29. Id. at 1043; see also Shinar, supra note 20, at 20–34 (asserting that there has been a 
convergence between public and private sector workplaces reflected in trends in the 
privatization of government functions, outsourcing, and civil service reforms). 
 30. Adam Shinar similarly argues that public employees are increasingly viewed as 
being just like private employees and that the effect is to erode the free speech rights of 
government employees. See Shinar, supra note 20, at 8–9. 
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Relying on an analogy to private employment to interpret public 
employees’ constitutional rights is a mistake. The analogy is a false 
one, because the arguments typically made for giving private 
employers broad managerial discretion do not apply with the same 
force, or at all, to government employers. The rights-based arguments 
that employers often invoke have no application to public entities. 
Because they are publicly funded to achieve publicly defined 
purposes, government employers cannot assert independent rights to 
property or autonomy in the same way that private firms do to avoid 
compliance with constitutional norms. Similarly, the claim that 
market pressures will tend to control overreaching by the private firm 
has little application to government employers, which are publicly 
funded and therefore largely insulated from market competition. In 
the private sector, compensation structures and competition for 
corporate control help to align the incentives of managers with the 
interests of the firm; however, those mechanisms are largely 
unavailable in the public sector. Instead, public accountability is key 
to ensuring that government managers act within the bounds set by 
the public’s interest, and government employees’ speech and privacy 
rights play a crucial role in ensuring that accountability. 
To be clear, my argument that government employment is 
distinctive does not equate to an argument against all regulation of 
private sector employment. It may well be the case that concerns 
about market failures, noncommodification, or social equality justify 
intervention to protect some employee speech and privacy rights in 
the private sector workplace.31 However, the purpose of this Article is 
to explain why the speech and privacy rights of public sector 
employees should be protected as a matter of constitutional 
guarantee. The appropriate degree of protection should be 
determined by the particular threats posed by the government’s 
exercise of its power as employer, not defined by reference to 
practices or norms in the private sector. Once that constitutional 
minimum is established, policy considerations might lead to the 
development of additional protections for public employees, or for 
private employees, by appropriate legislative or judicial action. 
Differing policy judgments will mean that, depending upon the 
 
 31. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. 
L. REV. 225, 225 (2013) (arguing that individual employment protections, including 
employee speech and privacy rights, are necessary to avoid the entrenchment of social 
status hierarchies); Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment 
Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 710–20 (1996) (describing market imperfections that 
may lead to the underprotection of employee privacy). 
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context, private sector employees may sometimes have similar, 
sometimes greater, and sometimes lesser protections than public 
employees. But the point of constitutional protections is to ensure a 
minimum level of protection for public employees against 
government action that is not vulnerable to shifting legislative 
judgments. 
This Article focuses on employee speech and privacy, even 
though public employees have other rights that they might claim 
under the Constitution.32 Speech and privacy have a critical 
connection to concerns about public accountability. Employee speech 
is often an important means of drawing public attention to abuses of 
government power. And although transparency plays an important 
role in ensuring accountability, privacy may also be necessary to 
nurture valuable employee speech.33 As the experience of the FDA 
employees illustrates,34 privacy violations—because they entail an 
exercise of power over another and impose dignitary harms—can be a 
form of retaliation for disfavored speech. Extensive monitoring and 
surveillance practices in turn can chill further speech.35 The 
relationship between employee speech and privacy is thus close and 
complex, and the argument developed here is specific to those rights 
because of the particular role they play in limiting government power. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the contrasting 
assumptions that frame employees’ speech and privacy claims. 
Constitutional guarantees establish the backdrop against which 
employment conditions are measured in the public workplace, while 
market norms dominate in the private sector. Part II examines more 
closely the Supreme Court’s public employee cases, first describing 
how constitutional doctrine has accommodated public agencies’ dual 
 
 32. For example, public employees might claim the right to due process before 
discharge, the right to be free from invidious discrimination, or the right to associate with 
other workers to address common concerns. Rights of association are closely related to 
speech and privacy, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–62 (1958), and to that extent, 
the analysis developed here might extend to those rights as well. However, the nature and 
constitutional source of individuals’ associational rights are contested. See, e.g., JOHN D. 
INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 2 (2012). Their 
significance in the workplace context is further complicated by the salience of employee 
association for the purpose of collective bargaining. For these reasons, consideration of 
public employees’ associational rights are too complex for consideration here, and I put 
them aside to focus more narrowly on individual speech and privacy rights.  
 33. Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
901, 920–22 (2012). 
 34. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text. 
 35. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as 
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1425 (2000); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. 
L. REV. 387, 401 (2008). 
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roles as both sovereign and employer, then highlighting how the 
Court has come to emphasize their managerial role by analogizing 
public employment to the private sector. In Part III, I contend that 
relying on an analogy between public and private sector employment 
when interpreting public employees’ constitutional rights is a mistake. 
As I explain, the public employer differs in its origin, its relation to 
the market, and the mechanisms for holding it accountable, and 
therefore, the usual rights-based and prudential arguments invoked 
by private firms to resist employment regulation do not apply.  
I.  PRIVATE SECTOR NORMS, PUBLIC SECTOR VALUES 
When considering employee speech and privacy rights, public 
and private sector workplaces operate in distinct legal spheres. For 
public employees, the starting assumption is that their employer, as a 
government actor, is constrained by the Constitution. Although 
accommodations are made for the government’s interests as 
employer, constitutional rights provide the relevant background 
against which individual disputes are decided. By contrast, in the 
private sector, market norms predominate. Because the state action 
doctrine limits constitutional restraints to government actors, 
constitutional protections for speech and privacy have little direct 
application to private employers.36 The terms and conditions of 
employment are determined through bargaining and mutual 
agreement between the parties, with the law presuming that 
employment lasts only so long as both parties desire it to continue.37 
Although the freedom to terminate employment is mutually available 
in theory, in practice it means that private sector employers have 
significant discretion not only over the duration of employment, but 
also over its terms and conditions. Thus, to the extent that private 
sector employees’ speech and privacy rights are protected, those 
 
 36. Exceptions exist where the challenged action can be attributed to the government, 
as when a private employer’s actions are required by a government regulation. See, e.g., 
NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
602, 614 (1989). Exceptions also exist when the government is entwined in the 
management or control of a private employer. See, e.g., Hughes v. Region VII Area 
Agency on Aging, 542 F.3d 169, 178 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 37. The law traditionally presumed employment to be at will, leaving the employer 
free to dismiss its employees “for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally 
wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.” Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 
Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884). Although recent common law and statutory developments have 
significantly eroded the employer’s unfettered ability to discharge employees for reasons 
that violate public policy, the general presumption of at-will employment remains in every 
American jurisdiction except Montana. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§	39-2-901 to -915 (2015). 
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protections represent affirmative interventions against a background 
norm of private contracting. 
Employees in the private sector today do receive some legal 
protection for speech and privacy interests. Statutory interventions at 
both the federal and state level protect against retaliation for certain 
types of speech, such as speech asserting employment rights,38 
opposing or reporting employer wrongdoing,39 or raising collective 
concerns about workplace conditions.40 However, because most 
protections are narrowly defined, vast swaths of speech by private 
employees remain unprotected. Significantly, the law provides hardly 
any protection to private employees for the type of speech falling at 
the core of First Amendment concerns—namely, speech on public 
issues.41 When private sector employees participate in public 
 
 38. For example, Title VII not only prohibits discrimination in employment, it also 
forbids employers from retaliating against employees who file a claim or object to 
practices made illegal under the statute. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-3(a) (2006). Similar 
antiretaliation provisions are found in most protective employment legislation. See, e.g., 29 
U.S.C. §	660(c) (2006) (Occupational Safety and Health Act); 29 U.S.C. §	215(a)(3) (2006) 
(Fair Labor Standards Act). 
 39. Common law doctrine and whistleblower statutes sometimes protect private 
employees discharged for reporting certain illegal or unethical employer activities, but 
they are often quite narrow in their reach. See MODESITT ET AL., supra note 18, at app. B 
(listing statutes protecting private employee whistleblowers). The whistleblower 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act, 18 U.S.C. §	1514A (2012) 
and 29 U.S.C. §	78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012), respectively, are also limited, applying only to 
employees of publicly traded companies or their contractors or agents, and only when they 
report specifically listed types of fraud or violations of securities regulations. See Richard 
E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 
1, 10–12 (2012); Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of 
Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 65 (2007). 
 40. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act guarantees the right of workers to 
engage in “concerted activities for	.	.	.	mutual aid or protection.” National Labor Relations 
Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §	7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §	157 (2012)). 
 41. See Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: Statutory 
Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295, 309–33 (2012) 
(reviewing different state statutes). Only one state, Connecticut, grants to private 
employees a generalized right to speech, forbidding employers from disciplining or 
discharging an employee “on account of the exercise by such employee of rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment	.	.	.	.” See CONN. GEN. STAT. §	31-51q (West, 
Westlaw through June 2015 Spec. Sess.); see also Cotto v. United Techs. Corp., 738 A.2d 
623, 634 (Conn. 1999) (holding that section 31-51q applies to private employers). A 
handful of other states more narrowly protect employees’ rights to engage in political 
activities or voting, see Volokh, supra, at 328–30, although it is often unclear how far such 
provisions will extend to protect speech. Compare Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610 (Cal. 1979) (holding that the “struggle of the homosexual 
community for equal rights	.	.	.	must be recognized as a political activity”), with 
Vanderhoff v. John Deere Consumer Prods., Inc., No. 3:02-0685-22, 2003 WL 23691107, at 
*2–3 (D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2003) (holding that display of a Confederate flag decal is not a 
political activity). 
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discourse, that speech usually falls between the islands of protection 
offered under laws protecting specific types of speech, leaving their 
employers free to discipline or discharge them in response. 
A similar patchwork of laws protects private sector employees’ 
privacy interests. Most legal interventions address a narrowly defined 
interest, and protections vary considerably from state to state.42 Broad 
guarantees of employee privacy are rare and often uncertain in 
scope.43 Only in California does the State Constitution directly 
protect privacy from intrusions by private actors, including 
employers.44 And while the common law tort of invasion of privacy 
has sometimes been applied to limit searches of employees’ personal 
effects and private locations,45 the requirement that any actionable 
intrusion be “highly offensive to a reasonable person”46 renders the 
common law far less protective than the Fourth Amendment’s 
“reasonableness” standard.47 Thus, to the extent that the law protects 
 
 42. To illustrate, six states restrict employers’ ability to engage in video surveillance at 
the workplace; four prohibit employers from implanting microchips in employees’ bodies; 
twelve require advance notice or consent for electronic monitoring; and ten prohibit 
employers from requesting that applicants or employees turn over passwords to their 
social media accounts. See FINKIN, supra note 18, at 1067–89. 
 43. For example, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
508, 100 Stat. 1848, prohibits the interception of electronic communications and 
unauthorized access to stored communications, but the statute’s exceptions often render 
its protections inapplicable in the employment context. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114–15 (3d Cir. 2003); Sporer v. UAL Corp., No. C 08-02835 
JSW, 2009 WL 2761329, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2009); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. 
Supp. 1232, 1236–37 (D. Nev. 1996). Employees have had more success under the ECPA 
in challenging employer access to password-protected accounts maintained outside the 
workplace. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *2–3 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 25, 2009); Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (W.D. Wis. 
2002). 
 44. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994) (extending the privacy 
protections of the California Constitution to private actors); TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. 
Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (applying the Hill analysis 
to a private employer, but finding no violation). In Alaska, the constitutional privacy 
provision does not apply directly to private actors but may serve as a source of public 
policy, limiting an employer’s ability to condition employment on employees permitting 
intrusions into their personal lives. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 
1131–33 (Alaska 1989). 
 45. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 74 S.W.3d 634, 648–49 (Ark. 2002) (finding 
a search of an employee’s home by his employer to be an invasion of privacy); Johnson v. 
Allen, 613 S.E.2d 657, 660–61 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a video camera in a 
women’s restroom was an invasion of privacy); Sowards v. Norbar, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 468, 
474–75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (deeming a search of an employee’s motel room an invasion 
of privacy). 
 46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 47. See Clifford S. Fishman, Electronic Privacy in the Government Workplace and City 
of Ontario, California v. Quon: The Supreme Court Brought Forth a Mouse, 81 MISS. L.J. 
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private sector employees’ speech and privacy rights, it does so by 
carving out exceptions against a background norm of employer 
prerogative. 
In contrast, constitutional values, rather than market norms, 
frame questions about employee speech and privacy in the public 
sector. Initially, market norms also dominated in the public sector, 
and public employees were presumed to accept their employment on 
the terms set by the government. As Oliver Wendell Holmes 
famously pronounced, “[a person] may have a constitutional right to 
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”48 
However, in a series of cases beginning in the mid-twentieth century, 
the Supreme Court rejected this approach, holding that government 
could not condition employment on the relinquishment of 
constitutional rights.49 By 1967, it was clear that “the theory that 
public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected 
to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been 
uniformly rejected.”50 As the Court explained in Perry v. 
Sindermann,51 “even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable 
governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him 
the benefit for any number of reasons . . . [i]t may not deny a benefit 
to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected 
interests . . . .”52 
Government employment is thus one of the classic situations in 
which the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been applied.53 
 
1359, 1415–17 (2012); Secunda, supra note 12, at 301; see also Matthew W. Finkin, 
Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221, 225–29 
(1996) (arguing that the common law provides very limited protection of employees’ 
privacy interests).  
 48. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).  
 49. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373–74 (1964); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. 
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485–87 (1960); 
Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557–58 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 
U.S. 183, 192 (1952). 
 50. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967) (quoting Keyishian v. 
Bd. of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1965)). 
 51. 408 U.S. 593 (1972), overruled on other grounds by Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 
(1991). 
 52. Id. at 597. 
 53. As Kathleen Sullivan explains,  
[u]nconstitutional conditions problems arise when government offers a benefit on 
condition that the recipient perform or forego an activity that a preferred 
constitutional right normally protects from government interference.	.	.	. The 
imposition of the condition on the benefit poses a dilemma: allocation of the 
benefit would normally be subject to deferential review, while imposition of a 
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While government need not offer certain benefits, when it does so, it 
may not impose conditions that “produce a result which [it] could not 
command directly.”54 Courts and scholars have struggled to articulate 
a clear test for when government-imposed conditions on receipt of a 
benefit should trigger close constitutional scrutiny,55 but government 
employment presents a clear case for its application. Because the 
threat of dismissal is a “potent means” of penalizing and inhibiting 
the exercise of individual rights,56 courts have regularly scrutinized 
government attempts to condition employment on the relinquishment 
of fundamental rights.57 
For employees in the public sector, then, constitutional values 
provide the background against which their claims to speech and 
privacy are made. As explored in greater detail in the next Part, those 
constitutional claims have always been subject to limitations to 
accommodate the government’s interests as an employer.58 
Nevertheless, constitutional doctrine is clear: public employees may 
not be compelled to relinquish “the First Amendment rights they 
would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public 
interest.”59 Similarly, when a government employer undertakes a 
search or seizure of the property of its employees, the restraints of the 
Fourth Amendment apply.60 
 
burden on the constitutional right would normally be strictly scrutinized. Which 
sort of review should apply? 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1421–22 
(1989); see also Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1175, 1177–78 (1996). 
 54. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)); see also 
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (raising constitutional concerns when 
conditions “pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion’	” (quoting Steward 
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937))). 
 55. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional 
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 4–5 (2001); Dorf, supra note 53, at 1177–
78; Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of 
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26–28 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The 
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1326–27 (1984); 
Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1421–22; William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1449–51 (1968). 
 56. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). 
 57. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 379–80, 392 (1987); Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976) (plurality opinion); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574; see also Rutan v. 
Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1980). 
 58. See infra Section II.A. 
 59. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 60. Although the Justices in O’Connor v. Ortega splintered over the analytic 
framework to be applied in the case, all nine agreed that the Fourth Amendment applies 
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Of course, public employees’ speech and privacy interests are not 
protected solely, or even primarily, by the Constitution. Civil service 
provisions often require good cause in order to discharge a public 
employee, and these protections significantly limit public employers’ 
ability to act arbitrarily, including in ways that burden their 
employees’ constitutional rights.61 In addition, statutes, such as 
whistleblower protection laws or information privacy laws, protect 
certain specific types of speech or privacy interests.62 Although these 
statutes may impose initial restrictions on the government employer, 
the Constitution provides “a residual protection”63 of employees’ 
speech and privacy interests. Because of the significant gaps in 
statutory coverage, however, that residual protection is important, 
establishing a “constitutional floor that catches the most egregious 
cases of government abuse.”64 
Although a great deal of variation exists in the details, the public 
and private sectors differ markedly in the overall structure of legal 
protection. For public employees, constitutional restraints establish 
background norms regarding employer interference with speech and 
privacy interests. Congress or state legislatures may choose to define 
those rights more precisely, expand them, or provide particular 
procedures for vindicating them. But this legislative activity occurs 
against a backdrop of the constitutional guarantees safeguarding 
certain fundamental values. By contrast, in the private sector, the 
starting assumption is one of managerial prerogative, not 
constitutional restraint. The background norm assumes that 
employers should be given wide discretion to manage their businesses 
as they see fit. If they manage poorly, any consequences will be felt 
privately, and their employees remain free to seek better options 
elsewhere. Legal protections for employees in the private sector are 
carve-outs from the background norm—exceptions created when 
intervention is deemed necessary to advance important public 
purposes. When or whether employee interests deserve such 
protection is thus a matter of shifting political judgments. And, unlike 
 
to the actions of a government employer. 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion); see 
also id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 732 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 61. Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 
101, 124–29 (1995); Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights that Work at Work: From the First 
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1477–78 (2007); George Rutherglen, 
Public Employee Speech in Remedial Perspective, 24 J.L. & POL. 129, 139 (2008).  
 62. See, e.g., MODESITT ET AL., supra note 18, at app. A, C (listing state and federal 
statutes protecting public sector employees’ speech). 
 63. Rutherglen, supra note 61, at 140. 
 64. Id. at 142. 
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in the public sector, there is no constitutional floor guaranteeing a 
minimum level of protection. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER 
Although public employees’ speech and privacy rights have long 
been protected by the Constitution, those protections have always 
been significantly qualified in the employment context to 
accommodate the government employer’s dual role as both employer 
and sovereign. The law accommodates the tension inherent in that 
dual role by imposing less demanding standards on government 
conduct, even as it protects the employee’s rights. In recent cases, 
however, the Court has relied on an analogy to the private sector 
workplace in a manner that emphasizes the government’s role as 
employer.65 In doing so, the Court implicitly invokes the market 
norms dominant in the private sector, while obscuring the 
government employer’s simultaneous status as sovereign and the 
constitutional norms that serve to restrain it in that capacity. 
A. A Dual Role 
When the Supreme Court held that public employment may not 
be conditioned on individuals relinquishing their constitutional rights, 
it did not simply apply existing constitutional doctrine to the 
employment context.66 Rather, it recognized that when a public 
employer acts against its employees, it inhabits dual roles—it is both 
sovereign and employer. Because of its status as sovereign, it must be 
restrained from using its power in a manner that burdens 
fundamental rights of speech and privacy. And because it is an 
 
 65. The public sector employee cases have long been influenced by understandings of 
employment in the private sector. As Ken Matheny and Marion Crain have argued, “the 
Court’s public employee speech cases are deeply influenced by a ‘private-sector profit 
maximization model,’ the traditional master-servant image of the employment relation 
borrowed from the common law, in which management is entitled to demand loyalty from 
its employees.” Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American” 
Labor Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1735 (2004) (citing Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & James A. 
Wright, “Riding with the Cops and Cheering for the Robbers”: Employee Speech, Doctrinal 
Cubbyholes, and the Duty of Loyalty, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 721, 780–81 (1998)). In the years 
since they wrote, this influence has become more pronounced. See infra Section II.B; see 
also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (“Government employers, like private 
employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; 
without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.”). 
 66. See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 148 (2011) (“[T]he Government has a much 
freer hand in dealing ‘with citizen employees than it does when it brings its sovereign 
power to bear on citizens at large.’	” (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 
591, 599 (2008))). 
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employer as well, constitutional doctrine was crafted in a manner that 
accommodates the legitimate managerial interests of the employer. 
Thus, although the Court applied constitutional restrictions in the 
public sector workplace, it was far more deferential to the 
government’s interests than in other situations in which the 
government acted purely as sovereign. 
Speech 
The Supreme Court’s public employee speech cases clearly 
recognize this dual role of the government employer. In Pickering v. 
Board of Education,67 the Court addressed a public school teacher’s 
claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was 
fired because he wrote a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the 
school board.68 The Court affirmed the public benefit of “free and 
unhindered debate on matters of public importance” as well as 
Pickering’s interest in participating in that debate.69 And it recognized 
that his dismissal from employment significantly burdened the 
exercise of his right to speak.70 Ordinarily, when the state exercises 
power directly in response to citizen speech, its actions are subject to 
strict scrutiny.71 In Pickering, however, the Court acknowledged that 
“the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its 
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in 
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”72 
As a result, rather than strictly scrutinizing government actions that 
burdened employee speech rights, the Court balanced the interests of 
the employee in speaking against the government’s interests “in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”73 
The Court suggested that factors such as maintaining discipline 
by supervisors or preserving harmony among coworkers weigh in 
favor of the government.74 At the same time, it also recognized that 
public employees’ speech may be particularly well informed and 
 
 67. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 68. Id. at 564–65. 
 69. Id. at 573. 
 70. Id. at 574–75. 
 71. See, e.g., Turner Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994) (“[L]aws favoring 
some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker 
preference reflects a content preference.”). 
 72. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 570. 
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likely to contribute to debate over important public issues.75 Weighing 
the circumstances in Pickering’s case, the Court concluded that 
because the letter he had written did not interfere with his teaching 
duties or the normal operation of the school generally, the school 
board could not constitutionally fire him for his speech.76 By doing so, 
the Court extended First Amendment protection to public employee 
speech but in a form far more deferential to the government’s 
interests than when the government acts purely as sovereign. 
In Rankin v. McPherson,77 the Court explained that the Pickering 
balancing test is “necessary in order to accommodate the dual role of 
the public employer.”78 It wrote: 
On the one hand, public employers are employers, concerned 
with the efficient function of their operations; review of every 
personnel decision made by a public employer could, in the 
long run, hamper the performance of public functions. On the 
other hand, “the threat of dismissal from public employment 
is . . . a potent means of inhibiting speech.” Vigilance is 
necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority 
over employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers 
public functions but simply because superiors disagree with the 
content of employees’ speech.79 
This dual role means that although the employment context weighs 
into the analysis, giving the government as employer a freer hand, the 
fact that the employer is also the government means that the 
Constitution still restrains its actions.80 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged numerous ways in which 
public employees’ speech rights depart from ordinary First 
Amendment principles. As the Court wrote in Waters v. Churchill,81 
“many of the most fundamental maxims of our First Amendment 
jurisprudence cannot reasonably be applied to speech by government 
employees.”82 For example, the usual constitutional tolerance of 
 
 75. Id. at 571–72. 
 76. Id. at 572–73. 
 77. 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
 78. Id. at 384. 
 79. Id. (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574).  
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465–66 
(1995); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671–72 (1994); see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 
543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (explaining that the Pickering balancing test reconciles the 
employees’ right to engage in speech with the employer’s legitimate interests in 
performing its mission). 
 81. 511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
 82. Id. at 672. 
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offensive utterances83 and false statements84 does not prevent the 
government employer from insisting on professional language and 
accurate statements when its employees deal with the public.85 
Moreover, courts afford greater deference to employer predictions of 
harm than in other situations when the government seeks to restrict 
citizen speech.86 And by suggesting that the maintenance of 
“discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers”87 is 
a relevant factor in the balancing analysis, Pickering appears to 
“constitutionaliz[e] . . . a heckler’s veto” in the employment setting.88 
Despite the general principle that listener reactions cannot justify 
regulating speech,89 public employee speech may be unprotected 
precisely because it causes a stir. 
The emphasis on operational efficiency also presents a striking 
contrast to other First Amendment contexts where concerns of 
government efficiency are given far less weight.90 Although the 
government generally “cannot restrict the speech of the public at 
large just in the name of efficiency,”91 the Pickering balancing test 
 
 83. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
 84. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387 (1967) (requiring actual malice for 
liability for invasion of privacy based on false statement regarding a matter of public 
interest); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that the First 
Amendment requires that a public official prove “actual malice” in order to recover for 
defamation). But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (1974) (declining 
to extend New York Times standard to defamatory statements about a private individual). 
 85. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 672. But see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 
(1968) (holding that “a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public 
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment” unless the 
statements were made with knowing or reckless falsity). 
 86. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 673; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 153–54 (1983) 
(giving additional weight to supervisor’s view that employee’s speech would disrupt an 
office). 
 87. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570. 
 88. Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
1007, 1019 (2005). 
 89. See, e.g., Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992), 
overruled on other grounds by City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D4, LLC, 541 U.S. 774 (2004) 
(“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.”); Terminiello 
v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“Accordingly a function of free speech under our 
system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when 
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even 
stirs people to anger.”). But see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978) 
(finding restraint of broadcast speech constitutional because it is uniquely pervasive and 
available to children); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (finding 
statute constitutional because it restrained fighting words likely to cause a breach of 
peace). 
 90. See Randy J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity: A Theory of Public Employee Rights, 
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1985, 1987–91 (2012). 
 91. Waters, 511 U.S. at 675. 
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explicitly weighs efficiency concerns, and government officials “enjoy 
wide latitude in managing their offices.”92 The reason for such 
accommodation, the Court explained in Waters, “comes from the 
nature of the government’s mission as employer[,]”93 which elevates 
its interests in achieving that mission “as effectively and efficiently as 
possible.”94 Still, efficiency concerns do not operate as a trump. The 
First Amendment has a significant limiting role to play because of the 
strong public benefit of hearing from government employees. As the 
Court acknowledged, “[g]overnment employees are often in the best 
position to know what ails the agencies for which they work; public 
debate may gain much from their informed opinions.”95 In addition, 
individual employees have “a strong, legitimate interest in speaking 
out on public matters.”96 The government’s interest as employer is 
thus accommodated not by trumping its employees’ First Amendment 
rights, but by allowing its interests to weigh more heavily than in cases 
involving government restraint of nonemployee citizen speech. 
Privacy 
Just as in the First Amendment context, public employees’ 
privacy rights differ significantly from the protections typically 
provided by the Fourth Amendment in order to accommodate the 
government’s interests as employer. In O’Connor v. Ortega,97 the 
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches 
and seizures of an employee’s personal effects by a government 
employer.98 O’Connor involved the claim of a state-employed 
physician that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when 
hospital administrators searched his office, desk, and file cabinets and 
seized several personal items.99 Although the Justices agreed that the 
challenged searches infringed the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations 
of privacy,100 the plurality noted that the “operational realities of the 
 
 92. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
 93. Waters, 511 U.S. at 674. 
 94. Id. at 675; cf. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (noting 
that the government need “to improve the efficiency, efficacy, and responsiveness of 
service to the public” applies equally to independent contractors). 
 95. Waters, 511 U.S. at 674. 
 96. Id. 
 97. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
 98. Id. at 714. 
 99. Id. at 712–14. 
 100. All nine Justices agreed that Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
desk and files. See id. at 718–19 (O’Connor, J., plurality); id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring); 
id. at 732–33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Scalia and the four dissenting Justices concluded 
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workplace . . . may make some employees’ expectations of privacy 
unreasonable.”101 Where an employee’s office is frequently accessed 
by supervisors, fellow employees, or the public, an expectation of 
privacy on the part of the employee may be reduced. Similarly, 
employer policies regulating personal effects in the workplace may 
undermine a claim of privacy. Thus, according to the plurality, the 
public employee’s expectation of privacy “must be assessed in the 
context of the employment relationship.”102 
Even if the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
light of workplace practices, the protection afforded public employees 
is markedly different from that typically provided by the Fourth 
Amendment. Ordinarily, government searches that infringe a 
legitimate expectation of privacy are considered reasonable only 
when authorized by a warrant issued on probable cause.103 The 
Supreme Court, however, has recognized that a warrant is not 
required in those situations “in which special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement” make the requirement 
“impracticable,”104 such as when school officials conduct searches 
necessary to maintain discipline,105 or when an agency conducts 
regulatory compliance inspections.106 Similarly, the plurality in 
O’Connor reasoned that when a search is undertaken in the 
government’s capacity as an employer, its “need for supervision, 
control, and the efficient operation of the workplace” must be 
balanced against the employees’ legitimate privacy interests.107 Under 
this standard, instead of the usual requirement of a warrant issued on 
probable cause, workplace searches need only satisfy a lesser 
 
that Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office. See id. at 731 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); id. at 732 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. at 717. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 191–92 (1990) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (describing the ordinary requirements to obtain a warrant); Mancusi v. 
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370 (1968) (“Except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a 
search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been 
authorized by a valid search warrant.” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–
29 (1967))); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967) (“One governing 
principle	.	.	.	has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of 
cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has 
been authorized by a valid search warrant.”). 
 104. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 105. See id. at 337–40 (plurality opinion). 
 106. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528. 
 107. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 719–20. 
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standard of “reasonableness under all the circumstances.”108 The 
plurality thus accommodated the government’s dual roles of 
sovereign and employer by applying Fourth Amendment constraints, 
but imposing a less stringent standard of reasonableness.109 
* * * * 
First and Fourth Amendment protections are thus significantly 
less demanding in the government workplace than in other contexts 
in order to accommodate the government’s interest as employer. 
Even these less demanding standards, however, offer significant 
protections for public employees. Applying the Pickering balancing 
test, the Supreme Court protected a teacher’s complaints to her 
principal about a school’s racially discriminatory practices110 and a 
clerical employee’s comments expressing hostility toward President 
Reagan because of his welfare policies.111 In a similar vein, the 
Supreme Court invalidated as a violation of First Amendment rights a 
statute that prohibited federal government employees from receiving 
 
 108. Id. at 725–26. In order to satisfy the demands of the Fourth Amendment, a search 
must be both “justified at its inception” and reasonable in scope. Id. at 726 (quoting Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968)). The Court wrote: “Ordinarily, a search	.	.	.	will be 
‘justified at its inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search 
will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the 
search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a 
needed file.” Id. A search will be “permissible in its scope when ‘the measures adopted are 
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of’	” 
the suspected misconduct. Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342). 
 109. As discussed in the next Section, Justice Scalia proposed a different test, namely 
that “government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations 
of workplace rules—searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the 
private-employer context—do not violate the Fourth Amendment.” O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 
732 (Scalia, J., concurring). As discussed in Section II.B, infra, Justice Scalia’s test relies 
more heavily on outcomes and practices in the private sector for determining the scope of 
public employees’ Fourth Amendment rights. But, after O’Connor, the Court reaffirmed 
the basic approach taken by the plurality in two subsequent cases challenging drug testing 
programs. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 678–79 (1989); 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633–34 (1989). In those cases, the Court 
first asked whether the drug tests intruded on employees’ legitimate expectations of 
privacy, then weighed the government’s interest in the testing protocol against the 
employees’ privacy interests. Although scholars have criticized the O’Connor plurality’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” balancing test as providing only anemic protection of 
public employees’ privacy rights, see, e.g., Don Mayer, Workplace Privacy and the Fourth 
Amendment: An End to Reasonable Expectations?, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 625, 630–32, 658–59 
(1992), it does provide a framework for scrutinizing public-employer intrusions and has 
provided some public employees with a measure of protection. See, e.g., cases cited infra 
notes 116–19. 
 110. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414–17 (1979). 
 111. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388–90 (1987). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 601 (2016) 
2015] GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS 623 
honoraria for giving speeches or writing articles.112 Other courts have 
applied the First Amendment to shield a broad range of employee 
speech, such as an internal memo raising concerns about patient 
privacy at a state psychiatric hospital,113 comments to the local media 
criticizing staff shortages at a fire department,114 and a publicly posted 
flyer critical of a town council’s management.115 
Similarly, although the Fourth Amendment standard applied to 
government employers is deferential it nevertheless offers some 
protection for employee privacy. Lower federal courts have found 
public employers to have infringed upon legitimate expectations of 
privacy when they recorded employees’ personal phone calls,116 seized 
and searched the contents of a government-issued laptop,117 and 
conducted video surveillance of a locker-break room.118 And under 
the framework laid out in the O’Connor plurality, they have 
scrutinized government employer searches to ensure that they are 
justified and no more intrusive in scope than necessary.119 Thus, 
although the constitutional limits on the public employer are less 
demanding because the government is acting in the dual roles of 
employer and sovereign, the limits nevertheless provide significant 
protections to public employees, particularly when compared with the 
private sector and its background rule of at-will employment. 
B. The Analogy to Private Employment 
While the doctrine governing public employees’ First and Fourth 
Amendment rights has always significantly accommodated the 
 
 112. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465, 470, 474, 480 
(1995). 
 113. See Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 591, 603 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 114. Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 366 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
 115. Gazarkiewicz v. Town of Kingsford Heights, 359 F.3d 933, 943–44, 949–50 (7th 
Cir. 2004). 
 116. Narducci v. Moore, 572 F.3d 313, 316, 319, 321 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 117. Maes v. Folberg, 504 F. Supp. 2d 339, 347 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 118. Rosario v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 2d 480, 498–99 (D.P.R. 2008). 
 119. See, e.g., Narducci, 572 F.3d at 321 (affirming denial of summary judgment 
because plaintiff presented significant evidence that recording of every phone call for a 
six-year period was unreasonable in scope); Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 
F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to district court to determine whether search of 
employee’s desk and credenza and seizure of materials was relevant to his job and 
reasonable in scope). In addition to the privacy protections afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment, a few lower federal courts have found public employees’ interests in 
avoiding disclosure of personal information to be protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., 
Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 954–57 (7th Cir. 2000); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 838 F. Supp. 631, 636–39 (D.D.C. 1993); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. 
U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 742 F. Supp. 450, 453–55 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
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government employer’s interests, recent cases reveal a more 
pronounced emphasis on the government’s managerial role. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked private sector employment as 
a reference point for analyzing the constitutional rights of public 
employees. In doing so, it has moved away from its understanding of 
the public employer as occupying dual roles and instead focused 
predominantly on its role as manager. 
Speech 
The Court’s opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos120 illustrates this shift 
in emphasis. The plaintiff, Richard Ceballos, a state prosecutor, 
objected to what he believed to be serious deficiencies in a search 
warrant obtained by the sheriff’s office.121 He raised his concerns with 
his supervisors and followed up with a disposition memorandum 
recommending dismissal,122 but his supervisors nevertheless decided 
to proceed with the case. Believing that he was obligated to do so 
under Brady v. Maryland,123 Ceballos turned over his memorandum 
as exculpatory evidence to defense counsel, and later disagreed with 
his supervisor regarding his testimony at a suppression hearing.124 He 
alleged that his supervisor retaliated against him after the hearing, in 
violation of his First Amendment rights.125 The Court rejected his 
claim, holding that because his speech constituted part of his “official 
duties,” he was not “speaking as [a] citizen[] for First Amendment 
purposes” and therefore, his employer’s actions were not subject to 
constitutional scrutiny.126 
While continuing to pay lip service to the interests of the 
individual employee speaker and of the public in hearing that speech, 
the majority opinion emphasized the importance of “managerial 
discretion” and “managerial discipline.”127 The Court pointed out that 
“[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a significant 
degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, 
there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public 
services.”128 Expressing concerns about the “displacement of 
 
 120. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 121. Id. at 413–14. 
 122. Id. at 414–15. 
 123. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 124. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 442 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. at 415 (majority opinion). 
 126. Id. at 421. 
 127. See id. at 422–25. 
 128. Id. at 418 (emphasis added). 
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managerial discretion,”129 the Court concluded that “the First 
Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an 
employee’s expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities.”130 
Thus, in the Court’s view, the First Amendment does not apply at all 
when it comes to speech that is a part of the employee’s job duties.131 
The analogy between the government and private employer does 
a great deal of rhetorical work in Garcetti. As discussed above, the 
Court’s earlier precedents had emphasized the “dual role” of the 
public employer132 and the need to balance the competing interests at 
stake. Applying those precedents, the Ninth Circuit easily concluded 
that Ceballos’s speech—raising concerns about alleged government 
misconduct—was on a matter of public concern and proceeded to 
engage in the Pickering balancing analysis.133 By invoking norms in 
the private sector workplace, the Supreme Court pretermitted this 
analysis. Just as in the private sector, the Court suggested, speech 
made pursuant to an employee’s job duties is simply part of what the 
employee has contracted to perform and not a matter of 
constitutional concern.134 Removing “official duty speech” from First 
Amendment protection thus made it irrelevant that Ceballos was 
speaking on a matter of public concern and avoided the need to 
scrutinize the government’s actions at all.135 
 
 129. Id. at 423. 
 130. Id. at 424. 
 131. The Garcetti decision has sparked considerable scholarly commentary, much of it 
critical. Scholars have criticized the decision for, among other things, relying on a false 
distinction between citizen speech and employee speech. See, e.g., Symposium, The Rookie 
Year of the Roberts Court & a Look Ahead, Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights, 34 PEPP. L. 
REV. 536, 538–39 (2007); Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both 
Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 670, 683 (2008) (criticizing the Court’s 
failure to recognize the memorandum as mixed speech); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public 
Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing, and §	1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 
U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 575 (2008). Scholars have also argued that it fails to adequately 
protect speech necessary to inform the public of government wrongdoing. See, e.g., 
Chemerinsky, supra, at 539; Nahmod, supra, at 581; Helen Norton, Constraining Public 
Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech To Protect Its Own 
Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4, 13–14 (2009); Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the 
First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 118 
(2008). Finally, critics contend that the Garcetti decision allows government to evade 
scrutiny of its actions by broadly defining employees’ job duties. See, e.g., Nahmod, supra, 
at 580–81. 
 132. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1986). 
 133. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 134. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22. 
 135. Id. 
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In concluding that Ceballos was “not speaking as [a] 
citizen[][,]”136 the Court drew a sharp line between the citizen-
government relationship and the employee-employer relationship, 
implicitly assuming that a categorical distinction exists between the 
two and that public employee speech can be neatly sorted into one 
category or the other. Extrapolating from this analysis, some scholars 
have drawn the inference that public employees’ speech rights should 
mirror that of private sector employees.137 For example, Patrick M. 
Garry praised the Garcetti decision for drawing a “fundamental 
distinction” between the relations of individual speaker-government 
and government employee-employer.138 In the latter situation, Garry 
argues, no constitutional protection should come into play, because 
“[p]ublic employees should not gain additional rights [through the 
Constitution] that private employees do not have.”139 In a similar 
vein, Lawrence Rosenthal applauds the emergence of what he calls a 
“First Amendment law of managerial prerogative.”140 
Others have been highly critical of the assumption that citizen 
speech is entirely distinct from government employees’ official duty 
speech. Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion, for example, criticized the 
majority for ignoring the possibility that an employee speaking 
pursuant to her job duties may also be speaking as a citizen.141 He 
argued that the public employee may still “wear a citizen’s hat”142 
even, or perhaps especially, when speaking on matters within his job 
duties. Similarly, the public’s interest in hearing the speech is not 
diminished merely because it falls within the speaker’s job duties.143 
 
 136. Id. at 421. 
 137. See, e.g., Garry, supra note 21, at 814; Robert Roberts, The Supreme Court and the 
Deconstitutionalization of the Freedom of Speech Rights of Public Employees, 27 REV. 
PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 171, 182–83 (2010); Kermit Roosevelt III, Not As Bad As You 
Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 642 (2012); 
Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 39, 43, 65–66. 
 138. Garry, supra note 21, at 813. 
 139. Id. at 816. 
 140. Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 39. According to Rosenthal, managerial prerogative 
means that “management necessarily enjoys the prerogative to evaluate [an employee’s 
duty-related] speech	.	.	.	[and] to take whatever remedial action it deems warranted.” Id. at 
43. He acknowledges that “in the private sector, managerial prerogative includes 
essentially unfettered power to regulate employee speech within applicable statutory and 
contractual parameters,” id. at 65, but sees one exception in the public sector context—
government may not discriminate on the basis of partisan affiliation unless it is a bona fide 
qualification for the position. Id. at 65–66. 
 141. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 430–33 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Chemerinsky, supra 
note 131, at 538; Corbin, supra note 131, at 605, 607; Nahmod, supra note 131, at 575–76. 
 142. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 430. 
 143. Id. at 433. 
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Yet, by characterizing Ceballos’s objections to the search warrant as 
solely employee speech, the Garcetti majority removes it entirely 
from constitutional protection and makes the denial of Ceballos’s 
claim seem inevitable. As Cynthia Estlund puts it, “the majority 
chooses to empower the public employer by adopting the analogy of 
private sector employment at will.”144 
Privacy 
The comparison between public and private workplaces also 
shapes the analysis in cases analyzing public sector employees’ 
privacy rights. As discussed above, the plurality in O’Connor v. 
Ortega emphasized the employment context in determining whether a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists and in setting the standard of 
reasonableness that should apply.145 And it briefly referenced the 
private sector in considering when public employees’ expectations of 
privacy might be reduced as a result of workplace practices.146 Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion proposed a different test that takes the 
analogy to the private sector even further. The government, he 
argued, “like any other employer, needs frequent and convenient 
access to its desks, offices, and file cabinets for work-related 
purposes.”147 Looking to practices in the private sector as setting an 
appropriate standard, he asserted that “searches of the sort that are 
regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer 
context . . . do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”148 
In the years following the O’Connor decision, most courts and 
litigants operated under the assumption that the plurality opinion 
governed, and they rarely analyzed or even mentioned Scalia’s 
alternative test.149 However, the Supreme Court’s decision in City of 
 
 144. Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to a 
First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 149 (2007). Estlund further notes that 
the Court “tells us precisely nothing about why the majority chooses that analogy in this 
case but not in others.” Id. 
 145. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
 146. Id. (“Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file 
cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by 
virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.”). 
 147. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See, e.g., Narducci v. Moore, 572 F.3d 313, 319 (7th Cir. 2009); Biby v. Bd. of 
Regents, 419 F.3d 845, 850–51 (8th Cir. 2005); Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73–74 (2d 
Cir. 2001). In the small handful of cases in which a lower court analyzed Scalia’s 
concurrence separately, it usually concluded that the plurality opinion controlled. See, e.g., 
United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002) (reading O’Connor as 
establishing the test set out in the plurality opinion); Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201, 1203–
04 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the O’Connor plurality’s reasonableness test governs 
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Ontario v. Quon150 focused renewed attention on Scalia’s concurrence 
by highlighting the disagreement between him and the plurality in 
O’Connor.151 The Quon Court concluded, however, that it “is not 
necessary to resolve” which test is the controlling precedent, because 
either would lead to the same result under the facts of the case.152 
Justice Scalia’s proposed standard—that “searches of the sort 
that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer 
context” satisfy the Fourth Amendment153—is highly indeterminate. 
The test could mean that if a practice is legal for private employers to 
engage in, a public employer does not violate constitutional standards 
when it does the same thing.154 Alternatively, the test could mean that 
if a given practice is commonly observed in the private sector, it 
satisfies constitutional standards.155 Or, putting emphasis on the word 
“reasonable,” the test might be asking whether the practice is one 
that reasonably should be permitted in the private sector in light of 
 
because Justice Scalia did not articulate a different standard, and even if he did, the 
plurality’s test is the Court’s least-common-denominator holding). 
 150. 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
 151. Id. at 756–57. 
 152. Id. 
 153. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 154. Some commentators appear to interpret Scalia’s proposed test in this way. For 
example, Clifford S. Fishman reads Scalia’s concurrence in O’Connor as arguing that 
government employees “should enjoy no greater (and no lesser) right to privacy than an 
employee of a non-governmental entity.” Fishman, supra note 47, at 1383, 1410 
(describing Justice Scalia’s test as articulating that “a government employee’s 
constitutional right to privacy in the workplace should be the same as the legal privacy 
rights of employees in the private workplace”). Similarly, Paul Secunda describes Scalia’s 
test as requiring that privacy rights in the public workplace should be the same as in the 
private workplace under the common law tort. Secunda, supra note 12, at 281. On this 
assumption, Fishman and Secunda each analyze the common law invasion of privacy tort 
as applied in the private employment setting to determine what rights public employees 
would have under Scalia’s test. Fishman, supra note 47, at 1383; Secunda, supra note 12, at 
294. Given considerable state law variations in the common law tort and in statutory 
protections of employee privacy interests, this approach would mean that the scope of 
Fourth Amendment rights would depend upon the state in which the Fourth Amendment 
was applied. The Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion “that concepts of privacy 
under the laws of each State are to determine the reach of the Fourth Amendment.” 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 44 (1988). 
 155. This interpretation is similarly contingent, depending on an empirical inquiry 
which in turn requires choosing which regions, industries, or employment sectors provide 
an appropriate reference pool. The Supreme Court has suggested in another context that 
resting constitutional rights on this type of market inquiry is inappropriate. See O’Hare 
Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 723 (1996) (“If results were to turn on 
these sorts of distinctions, courts would have to inquire into the extent to which the 
government dominates various job markets as employer or as contractor. We have been, 
and we remain, unwilling to send courts down that path.”). 
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societal norms.156 Each of these interpretations raises considerable 
difficulties in determining exactly what should be considered 
“reasonable and normal” in the private sector workplace. 
There is another possible interpretation of Justice Scalia’s 
“reasonable and normal in the private-employer context”157 test—
namely, that public sector employees have no greater rights to privacy 
than what private employees receive under the federal Constitution. 
And because employees in the private sector receive no protection 
from the Fourth Amendment against searches by their employers, the 
implication is that public sector employees should not either. 
Employees of private firms have Fourth Amendment rights against 
the government when it acts purely in its sovereign capacity—as when 
the police search for evidence of criminal wrongdoing in a suspect’s 
office—and so, too, does the government employee. When, however, 
an employee complains of intrusive searches by her employer, the 
Fourth Amendment would provide no protection at all to either the 
public or private sector employee. If this interpretation is correct—
and it is arguably most consistent with language elsewhere in Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence—it represents an implicit repudiation of the 
doctrine, repeated in numerous cases over decades, that government 
employment cannot be conditioned on the relinquishment of 
constitutional rights.158 
Most recently, the Supreme Court relied on a comparison with 
private sector employment in NASA v. Nelson,159 which challenged 
the intrusiveness of government-required background 
investigations.160 The plaintiffs, employees of a federal contractor, 
argued that questions seeking information about treatment or 
counseling for illegal drug use and open-ended inquiries calling for 
any type of adverse information from third parties violated their 
 
 156. This approach raises the question of how to determine what is reasonable in the 
private sector. 
 157. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 158. See, e.g., O’Hare, 518 U.S. at 717 (“A State may not condition public employment 
on an employee’s exercise of his or her First Amendment rights.”); Perry v. Sindermann, 
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (observing that government “may not deny a benefit to a person 
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in 
freedom of speech” and noting the frequent application of this principle in the public 
employment context); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967) (rejecting the 
premise “that public employment, including academic employment, may be conditioned 
upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct 
government action”). 
 159. 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). 
 160. Id. at 751. 
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“constitutional right to informational privacy.”161 The Court 
“assume[d], without deciding” that the Constitution protects a 
“privacy ‘interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,’ ”162 but 
nevertheless rejected the plaintiffs’ claims. Emphasizing that this case 
involved the Government’s role as “proprietor” and “manager,” 
rather than regulator, the Court stressed the “ ‘wide latitude’ granted 
the Government in its dealings with employees.”163 It noted that the 
types of inquiries the plaintiffs objected to are “part of a standard 
employment background check of the sort used by millions of private 
employers”164 and concluded that the reasonableness of such 
questions “is illustrated by their pervasiveness in the public and 
private sectors.”165 The analogy to the private sector thus allowed the 
Court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims without actually deciding 
whether a right of information privacy exists and if so, when it 
restrains the government employer. Instead, the Court presumed that 
even were such a right to exist, the prevalence of similar investigative 
practices in the private sector would negate the constitutional claim. 
* * * * 
References to the private sector workplace are increasingly 
common in cases addressing public employees’ constitutional rights, 
and yet the Court has not clearly spelled out why the analogy is 
relevant or what role it should play in shaping constitutional 
standards. Instead, the comparison with private sector employment 
serves a rhetorical function. It suggests that the employment context 
is the most important factor for the constitutional analysis. By doing 
so, it renders the government employer’s managerial needs far more 
salient, while obscuring the fact that it is also, still, the government. 
Attention is diverted away from the values underlying constitutional 
 
 161. Id. at 754. 
 162. Id. at 751 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).  
 163. Id. at 761. 
 164. Id. at 758. 
 165. Id. at 761. Although the Court’s opinion did not expressly equate constitutional 
standards with practices in the private sector, an exchange during oral argument suggests 
the reasoning behind the analogy. Chief Justice Roberts asked Neal Katyal, the acting 
Solicitor General, during oral argument: “Do you think the Government’s right to inquire 
in the employment context is exactly as broad as a private employer’s right?” Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 14, NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011) (No. 09-530), http://www
.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-530.pdf	[http://perma.cc
/7GNE-DRRW (dark archive)]. Katyal responded: “[T]he private employers are a good 
template. If the Government is simply mirroring what private employers do, as Justice 
Scalia said in O’Connor v. Ortega, that’s a good suggestion that what it’s doing is 
reasonable.” Id.  
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guarantees of speech and privacy and focused instead on the market 
norms that prevail in the private sector. As a result, the government’s 
dual role—as employer and sovereign—disappears from view. Using 
private employment as a reference point thus shifts the frame of 
reference in a way that tends to emphasize market norms at the 
expense of constitutional values. 
III.  A MISTAKEN ANALOGY 
The Supreme Court’s repeated comparison of public and private 
workplaces raises the following question: should the speech and 
privacy rights of government employees be measured against norms 
and practices in the private sector? Put differently, is there anything 
wrong with the Court’s recent emphasis on market norms when 
interpreting public employees’ speech and privacy claims? A close 
analogy between public and private workplaces may at first seem 
obvious. Both settings present the same challenge of managing 
individual efforts to achieve organizational goals. In both, the law 
must navigate a tension between the employer’s interest in efficiency 
and the employee’s interest in maintaining a certain measure of 
personal autonomy. And yet, as I argue below, the reliance on the 
analogy between public and private employment overlooks important 
differences between the two sectors. 
Scholars who argue that the rights of private employees should 
match those of public employees focus on the similarities in workers’ 
interests across the two sectors. Joseph Grodin, for example, argues 
that “[a]n employee’s interest in expressing his views, in protecting his 
privacy against intrusion, or in being treated fairly is the same 
whether his employer is a governmental entity or a private 
corporation.”166 Although acknowledging that different 
considerations come into play when the government is the employer, 
he asserts that the availability of constitutional rights to protect public 
employees “provides strong support for a claim by private employees 
that they are entitled to equal respect.”167 
Scholars who defend the Court’s move toward a more 
managerial approach to interpreting public employees’ constitutional 
claims also emphasize the similarities in the situation of public and 
 
 166. Grodin, supra note 12, at 14; see also, e.g., Summers, supra note 12, at 692 (arguing 
that employees’ personal freedoms are threatened not only by the state, but also by 
private employers with the power to deprive them of their livelihoods); Wilborn, supra 
note 12, at 830 (arguing that invasions of privacy by private employers are just as harmful 
as government intrusions). 
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private sector employees. Kermit Roosevelt, for example, suggests 
that public employees are not threatened with any greater coercive 
peril to their liberty than private employees because the government 
employer, like the private firm, cannot put its employees in jail if it 
disapproves of their speech.168 Others have argued that when 
threatened with job loss government employees can exercise the same 
option available to any employee—namely, seeking alternative 
employment, either elsewhere in the public sector or at a private 
firm.169 Focusing on whether employer demands feel coercive makes 
the situation of public and private sector employees look similar. An 
employee who fears losing her job if her speech displeases her 
employer and, therefore, stays silent has experienced much the same 
type of compulsion whether she works for a firm or a government 
agency. 
Although things might look similar from the employee’s 
perspective, looking at the employer’s side of the equation reveals 
some real differences. The objections typically raised against 
regulating private employers either do not apply or lose force when 
the government is the employer. In this Part, I examine two types of 
claims—rights-based and prudential—which are commonly made to 
oppose employment regulation in the private sector.170 Rights-based 
arguments claim that employers themselves have rights against the 
state that may be infringed by workplace regulation. Arguments 
based on prudential considerations assert that regulating the terms 
and conditions of employment is unnecessary or even counter-
productive given that firms are subject to the discipline of market 
forces. Both these types of arguments are highly contested even when 
asserted by private firms. However, whether or not they are 
 
 168. Roosevelt, supra note 137, at 639–40. Of course, the government’s threatened use 
of force is not necessary to find a constitutional violation. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly and in a wide variety of contexts held the Constitution to restrain government 
activity, even when the use of force was not at issue. See Kreimer, supra note 55, at 1318 
(“[I]t is hard to imagine any modern constitutional theorist taking the position that only a 
direct threat of violence would violate constitutional rights.”). Thus, the Court has found 
that the Constitution constrains government when, for example, it puts conditions on the 
provision of public services, Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000); 
assesses property for taxing purposes, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm’n, 488 
U.S. 336, 338 (1989); or establishes zoning regulations, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374, 396 (1994). 
 169. Garry, supra note 21, at 816; Kozel, supra note 88, at 1030–31. 
 170. Of course, there are arguments that apply in both sectors—for example, the need 
for some managerial discretion in order to accomplish the purposes of the employment. 
However, these considerations are already taken into account in First and Fourth 
Amendment doctrines that are less demanding of the government when acting as an 
employer rather than purely as sovereign. See discussion supra Section II.A.  
94 N.C. L. REV. 601 (2016) 
2015] GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS 633 
persuasive in the context of private sector employment, they have 
little application to government employment. Because the 
government employer stands in a different relationship to the public 
and to the market, it is a mistake to rely on an analogy to the private 
workplace to interpret public employees’ rights. 
A. Rights-Based Arguments 
Private employers resist regulation by invoking their own status 
as rights-holders. The government employer, however, differs 
fundamentally in the source of its power to act, putting its claims to 
resist employees’ speech and privacy rights on a different footing. 
Thus, whatever force rights-based arguments have when deployed by 
private firms, they have little application to the government 
employer. 
When employees seek protection of their speech and privacy 
interests, private employers typically invoke their own property 
rights.171 As owner and manager of the enterprise, the firm asserts the 
right to control the conditions of employment.172 On this view, the job 
is the property of the employer, who is entitled to set the terms of 
employment as it sees fit.173 More generally, regulation of the 
employment relationship is resisted as an interference with economic 
 
 171. See Summers, supra note 12, at 693–94. 
 172. The classic expression of this position is found in Payne v. Western & Atlantic 
Railroad Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 517–18 (1884), overruled in part by Hutton v. Watters, 179 
S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915). In holding that an employer could condition employment on 
obeying its restrictions, the court wrote: 
 
Is it unlawful	.	.	.	to threaten to discharge employe[e]s if they trade with 
a certain merchant?	.	.	.	May I not refuse to trade with any one? May I 
not forbid my family to trade with any one? May I not dismiss my 
domestic servant for dealing, or even visiting, where I forbid? And if 
my domestic, why not my farm-hand, or my mechanic, or teamster? 
And, if one of them, then why not all four? And, if all four, why not a 
hundred or a thousand of them?	.	.	.	[M]en must be left, without 
interference to buy and sell where they please, and to discharge or 
retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad 
cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. 
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 173. See Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right 
of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 78 (2000) (“The employer, as owner of the 
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worker who fills it. That property right gives the employer the right to impose any 
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ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 8–9 (1983) (arguing that assumptions that the 
workplace is the property of the employer underlie labor law doctrines granting rights of 
control to management). 
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liberty.174 Although freedom of contract has long since lost its status 
as a constitutional trump card, advocates and scholars continue to 
insist that the “basic principle of autonomy” requires that any 
regulatory interference with private employment contracts “bear a 
heavy burden of justification . . . .”175 
Of course, these rights are not absolute. “Property” and 
“contract” are not natural categories that antedate social 
arrangements, but are themselves constituted by law. Claims of 
property and autonomy have often yielded to important public 
purposes. And yet, in our current constitutional order, rights invoked 
by private parties against the government have some heft because 
protection is thought necessary to create “centers of choice 
independent of the government.”176 Allowing space for choice not 
only enhances individual autonomy, it also promotes overall social 
welfare. Property rights are thought to achieve the latter function 
precisely because individuals will use those rights to pursue purely 
private ends.177 By contrast, the government employer acts pursuant 
to a publicly granted power for the pursuit of collectively defined 
ends. As Seth Kreimer writes, “[n]o public enterprise, however 
proprietary, can claim the same genealogy as a private enterprise. 
Somewhere along the line it rests on the sovereign taxing power, and 
it cannot plausibly claim to be the unsullied product of freely adopted 
private choices.”178 
Thus, the argument for respecting private property as the 
outcome of private choices does not apply to “aggregations of capital 
formed through government’s power to tax and appropriate funds.”179 
Because public property stems from a different source, no autonomy 
interests weigh on the public employer’s side of the balance as they 
might for the private employer resisting an employee’s claim of 
constitutional rights. 
The power of the government agency not only arises from a 
different source, it is also granted for a different purpose. Property 
and liberty interests are defended as welfare enhancing because they 
 
 174. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 
953–55 (1984). 
 175. Id. at 954. 
 176. Kreimer, supra note 55, at 1322. 
 177. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 477–78 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1976) (1776) (arguing that 
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permit outcomes to be determined by the unfettered interaction of 
individual market choices.180 Unlike private rights, which are intended 
to encourage the pursuit of private ends, power is granted to 
government agencies for the purpose of achieving collective goals 
arrived at through a process of public deliberation. Government 
agencies are expected to use that power to advance those publicly 
defined goals, not to exercise their individual autonomy or pursue 
their private ends. They may require some measure of freedom in 
order to effectively achieve those public purposes, but that freedom is 
subordinate to the overall public goals they were created to pursue. 
The government employer thus has no independent property or 
autonomy rights to invoke as a private employer might. 
One might object to the argument that government is different 
because it pursues public goals on the grounds that government 
agencies do not in fact pursue public purposes. The public choice 
literature asserts that government policy more often reflects the 
interests of well-organized interest groups rather than truly 
majoritarian preferences.181 Even if public choice theorists are right, 
however, that would hardly strengthen the rights-based claims of a 
government employer. Private interests may assert property and 
autonomy rights when utilizing private resources, but the fact that 
they may sometimes succeed in capturing government agencies 
should not entitle them to claim those rights on behalf of the captured 
agency. Thus, whether pursuing truly public interests or well-
organized private interests, government agencies cannot rely on the 
rights-based claims invoked by private firms. 
In the case of public employee speech rights, another objection 
might be that the government can claim an interest in promoting its 
own message. Several Supreme Court cases have noted that when the 
government is the speaker, it is permitted to control the content of its 
expression as well as to “ensure that its message is neither garbled nor 
distorted . . . .”182 This “latitude” is afforded the government as 
speaker because the state is ultimately “accountable to the electorate 
and the political process for its advocacy.”183 While government 
speech is inevitable, it is generally agreed that government has no 
 
 180. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 177–78 (1974) 
(describing various considerations favoring private property rights). 
 181. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: 
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groups influence the political process). 
 182. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
 183. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234–35 (2000). 
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First Amendment right to speak.184 Rather, the government speech 
doctrine has been invoked as a defense, permitting actions alleged to 
burden private speech when necessary to disseminate the 
government’s message.185 
To begin with, it is unclear whether the government speech 
doctrine applies when the First Amendment claimant is a public 
employee. No Supreme Court case has ever directly applied the 
government speech doctrine to deny a public employee’s First 
Amendment claim,186 although the majority opinion in Garcetti 
appears to have been influenced by it.187 That opinion, however, 
mentions only one of the Court’s earlier cases on government 
speech—Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of 
Virginia188—in a “cf.” reference,189 and its reasoning does not track 
that of a government speech defense’s identification of a particular 
message that the government intended to convey. Instead, it 
characterizes the discipline taken against the employee, Ceballos, for 
his speech as “simply . . . the exercise of employer control over what 
the employer itself has commissioned or created”190—invoking 
something closer to a property claim than a speech interest. 
According to the Court majority, Ceballos’s speech was unprotected 
because he spoke while on the job,191 not because government control 
of his speech was necessary to convey its own message. In fact, the 
government speech doctrine fits poorly with the facts in Garcetti.192 As 
the dissenting Justices argued, Ceballos was not hired to “broadcast[] 
 
 184. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 695, 708 (2011); Norton, supra note 131, at 24 & n.91 (listing authorities). 
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Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193–94 (1991). 
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 189. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422. Cf. is used when the “[c]ited authority supports a 
proposition different from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend 
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 190. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422. 
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a particular message set by the government . . . .”193 Even though his 
official job duties included speaking, he was not hired as a 
mouthpiece, but to speak as a professional—as a lawyer exercising 
independent judgment and bound by the ethical responsibilities of the 
profession.194 Thus, the Garcetti holding arguably should not be 
understood as an application of the government speech doctrine.195 
If the government speech doctrine is relevant at all to public 
employees’ First Amendment claims, it should apply only in a narrow 
set of circumstances. As Helen Norton has argued, the value of 
government speech depends on its transparency.196 Only when it is 
clear that it is the government speaking can listeners evaluate its 
credibility and hold the government accountable if they object.197 
Thus, the government speech doctrine should apply only when a 
public employee is “specifically hired to deliver a particular viewpoint 
that is transparently governmental in origin . . . .”198 Norton’s 
examples include the press secretary or lobbyist hired to promote a 
school board’s antivoucher position, the health department employee 
hired to lead an antismoking campaign, and the pro-abstinence 
counselor hired by a school.199 To the extent it applies at all, it would 
affect a “much smaller slice of public employee speech than does 
Garcetti’s ‘pursuant to official duties’ test.”200 Apart from these types 
of situations, the government’s own speech interest does not have 
much force independent of the Court’s oft-repeated observation that 
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the government has an interest in managing its employees to advance 
the goals of the agency. In the public employment context, then, the 
government speech doctrine adds little heft to the public employers’ 
side of the balance. 
B. Market Discipline and Political Accountability 
In addition to rights-based claims, private employers also resist 
legal protection of employee interests by arguing that such regulation 
is unnecessary or counterproductive given the discipline imposed by 
well-functioning markets.201 Once again, however, whether or not this 
argument is persuasive when pressed by private firms, it loses force 
when applied to government employers. As discussed in this Section, 
public agencies are funded by the public fisc and are therefore far 
more insulated from market competition than the typical private firm. 
In addition, government agencies exist to achieve certain public 
purposes rather than to pursue purely private gain. As a result, the 
mechanisms of control and accountability differ between the two 
sectors, such that the significance of infringing upon employee speech 
and privacy rights also differs. 
Efficiency-based arguments assert that interventions to protect 
workers’ speech and privacy interests are unnecessary given the 
discipline imposed by competitive markets. If employees truly value 
the ability to speak freely or to protect personal privacy, any 
employer that invades those rights will be imposing a cost on workers. 
With the package of wages and working conditions now appearing 
less desirable, employees will seek work elsewhere, thereby 
simultaneously escaping the burdensome conditions and raising labor 
costs for the offending employer.202 In order to retain the best 
workers, the employer will either have to modify its requirements or 
raise wages. Thus, according to Todd Henderson, because firms face 
“relentless and finely tuned labor markets,” they will be 
“constrain[ed] . . . from imposing restrictions on employee conduct 
that are excessive or out of relation to the costs that conduct imposes 
on the firm’s owners.”203 
Comparisons between public and private workplaces rest on the 
assumption that labor markets operate in the same way in both 
sectors. For example, commenters defending the use of private sector 
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norms to determine the scope of employees’ constitutional rights 
argue that the public employee who loses her job for exercising her 
rights is free to get another job elsewhere, including in the private 
sector.204 While it may be true that public employers rarely hold 
monopsony power, private sector jobs are not always fungible with 
public sector jobs. For some types of jobs, the government is the only 
relevant employer. Workers with a particular skill set may be able to 
substitute a private sector job for a public sector job, but this 
substitution will often entail a loss to the employee.205 For example, a 
lawyer who wishes to serve as a prosecutor could get a job at a private 
firm, and a law enforcement officer could work as a private security 
guard, but the alternative job in the private sector may not provide 
the same type of experience or sense of purpose and meaning, even if 
the material rewards are comparable. Of course, this will not always 
be the case. Sometimes, the focus of the job is utilizing a particular 
skill set, regardless of the context,206 and in other cases, alternative 
jobs may exist within the public sector, as when an attorney moves 
from a state to a federal prosecutor’s office. Public sector 
employment, however, often entails forms of compensation such as 
civil service protections or pension benefits tied to seniority that are 
not easily replaced, meaning that alternative jobs may not be 
fungible, particularly for a public employee with long tenure. All of 
this is not to argue that public employers face no constraints, but to 
point out that there is likely to be some stickiness making it 
improbable that they operate in a “relentless and finely tuned labor 
market” as it is asserted that private employers do.207 And to that 
extent, the government employer will have greater leverage to impose 
conditions infringing on basic rights. 
Whether or not the government agency faces different labor 
market conditions than private employers, its relationships to 
consumption and capital markets are radically different. Private firms 
must compete not only for labor, but for customers and capital as 
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well, and these markets also have a disciplining effect on managerial 
overreaching. Slack demand or low-cost competitors pressure private 
firms to eliminate inefficient management practices. Similarly, an 
effective market for corporate control will reward good managers and 
force out bad ones. Gratuitously intrusive or inefficiently burdensome 
restrictions on its employees will affect a firm’s bottom line and thus 
managers, who face “high-powered incentives to maximize firm 
value,” will be constrained from adopting those practices.208 Public 
agencies, on the other hand, are funded by the public fisc rather than 
through sales of their products in a competitive market, and public 
officials are subject to replacement through political rather than 
market processes. This insulation from market pressures means that 
these pressures do not have the same disciplining effect on the public 
employer. Thus, even if market efficiency justifies deregulation of the 
private employment relationship, the same rationale does not apply 
to government agencies. 
The assumption to this point has been that employer-imposed 
burdens on employee speech and privacy rights are efficiency 
enhancing. Because permitting employee speech or respecting 
employee privacy imposes costs on the employer’s productive 
process, the argument goes, employers will infringe these interests 
only when the efficiency gains in doing so outweigh the costs imposed 
when unhappy workers seek higher wages or alternative employment. 
Court opinions considering the speech and privacy rights of public 
employees make a similar assumption that rights-infringing practices 
are efficient and that giving the government a freer hand will allow it 
to more effectively accomplish its purposes. For example, the 
Pickering-Connick balancing test weighs the employees’ interests in 
speaking against the smooth operation of the public workplace. 
Similarly, in Garcetti the Court warns that without “a significant 
degree of control over their employees’ words . . . there would be little 
chance for the efficient provision of public services.”209 The same 
assumption underlies the Court’s analysis of employee privacy rights. 
As the plurality in O’Connor wrote, employees’ Fourth Amendment 
interests must be balanced “against the government’s need for 
supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.”210 
While it is certainly true that employee assertions of speech and 
privacy rights disrupt managerial control over the workplace, not all 
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exercises of managerial discretion are necessarily efficiency 
enhancing. Suppressing employee speech may avoid disruptions and 
help the workplace operate more smoothly; it may also reduce morale 
and block expression that would inform management and improve 
workplace operations.211 The public sector manager may punish 
employees for their speech in order to enforce legitimate workplace 
rules, or simply because she finds their expression distasteful or 
unwelcome. Intrusive searches or surveillance may effectively detect 
and discourage employee misconduct, or they may entail a diversion 
of resources or deter valuable employee speech without any 
commensurate benefit to the agency or the public. Thus, not all 
employee claims of speech and privacy rights inevitably interfere with 
effective government operations. In at least some instances, 
employers’ rights-infringing practices may harm rather than enhance 
the efficiency of the agency. Once again, however, the government 
employer’s insulation from the market means that competitive 
pressures are far less likely to drive out these types of inefficient, 
rights-infringing practices in the public sector. 
More importantly, protecting public employee rights promotes 
important interests even—and especially—when it would be more 
efficient from the government’s perspective to override them. In 
particular, public employee speech that reveals ineptitude or 
wrongdoing may interfere with “the efficient provision of public 
services,”212 but is valuable precisely because it is disruptive.213 
Protecting this speech is crucial because it plays an important function 
in ensuring accountability of public agencies. Here again, the contrast 
with the private firm is a sharp one. While the firm primarily seeks 
financial gain for its owners, the public employer exists to provide 
services or pursue policies agreed upon through some process of 
public deliberation. Both shareholders and the public face agency 
problems in ensuring that managers pursue the goals for which they 
were hired. However, because the firm is organized for private gain, 
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the owners of the firm can evaluate executive performance based on 
financial outcomes and have the ability to structure compensation in a 
way that tends to align managers’ incentives with their own. By 
contrast, in the public agency, there is no economic surplus created 
that can be used to measure the effectiveness of public sector 
managers or to align their incentives with the interests of the public.214 
Instead, the performance of government agencies is monitored 
through public examination and discussion, and agency officials are 
called to account through the political process. 
Because political accountability is the primary means by which 
the public seeks to ensure that public managers are pursuing public 
goals, speech by public employees plays a particularly important role 
in self-governance. First Amendment theory has long recognized that 
speech rights protect not only the speakers’ autonomy interests, but 
also a public interest in hearing what the speaker has to say.215 Citizen 
speech in general contributes to the “marketplace of ideas”216 
necessary for informed self-government, but the public particularly 
benefits from hearing from public sector employees; their knowledge 
can help shape public understanding of how government operates and 
inform assessments of its effectiveness.217 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that public 
employees are particularly well situated to contribute to public debate 
about the agencies for which they work. In Pickering, the Court wrote 
that “[t]eachers are, as a class, the members of a community most 
likely to have informed and definite opinions” about the funding and 
operation of schools.218 Similarly, it recognized in Waters v. Churchill 
that “[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to know 
what ails the agencies for which they work; public debate may gain 
much from their informed opinions.”219 Precisely because of their role 
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as government employees, they have access to more and different 
kinds of information about the operation of government and the 
policies it is pursuing. Their speech does not merely add another 
voice to the debate; rather, it provides information that is uniquely 
important to informing the public and ensuring political 
accountability. 
Most scholarly commentary has endorsed the Supreme Court’s 
observation that public employee speech is valuable because of its 
contribution to public debate.220 Lawrence Rosenthal, however, has 
drawn starkly different implications from the importance of political 
accountability. He argues that political accountability requires that 
public employees have less rather than more First Amendment 
protection because officials must be given “full and effective control” 
over their employees’ performance, including on-the-job speech, so 
that public officials can fairly be held to account for the operation of 
their offices.221 If public sector managers overreach, he asserts, the 
public will respond by voting them out of office.222 Thus, he defends 
the holding in Garcetti as “leav[ing] judgments about the soundness of 
managerial philosophy—on the management of employee speech as 
with all other matters within the scope of managerial prerogative—to 
the political process.”223 
Rosenthal’s argument for granting government employers full 
managerial control rests on his belief that the market for political 
control will effectively constrain public employers. In order for a 
government agency to be held accountable for achieving its goals, 
however, the public must have sufficient information about its 
operations to assess its performance. It is for this reason that 
numerous scholars have criticized the Garcetti decision.224 By 
exempting from First Amendment protection public employees’ 
speech made pursuant to their job duties, “[i]t allows elected officials 
to suppress whistleblowing and other on-the-job communications that 
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would otherwise facilitate the public’s ability to engage in political 
accountability measures . . . .”225 Rosenthal disagrees, implicitly 
assuming that dissenting employee speech is unnecessary to bring to 
light instances of government ineptitude or overreaching.226 In fact, in 
the years following Garcetti, the lower federal courts denied 
protection to numerous government employees who objected to their 
employers’ illegal practices, health and safety violations, and financial 
improprieties.227 The cumulative effect of these rulings is likely to 
significantly reduce the production of information about questionable 
agency practices in the future. 
The political market for control is also far less likely to be 
effective in holding agencies accountable for their “managerial 
philosophy”—including how they treat their employees. Long before 
Garcetti denied protection to employees’ “official duty” speech, the 
Court in Connick v. Myers228 held that the First Amendment generally 
does not protect government employees when they raise grievances 
about their workplace,229 thereby making it less likely that these issues 
will be raised publicly. Even if employee grievances are aired, 
questions about an agency’s “managerial philosophy” will rarely be 
salient enough to attract voter attention, let alone to drive electoral 
outcomes in a manner that would have a disciplining effect. 
Moreover, many public officials with managerial authority are 
appointed rather than elected. Apart from a handful of high profile 
political appointments, most of these public officials will be largely 
insulated from electoral control over how they run their offices. 
The political market for control is likely to be ineffective in 
protecting valuable public employee speech from government 
retaliation for another reason as well. Even though public employee 
speech may provide important information about how government is 
doing its job, the voting public may not always appreciate the 
individual who plays this role. Public employee speech is likely to be 
disruptive, particularly when it highlights wrongdoing or challenges 
widely accepted orthodoxies, and in such situations, a majority of the 
public may see its interests as more closely aligned with the 
government manager than with the employee. In such a situation, 
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electoral politics may well reward rather than constrain the 
overreaching official. To use the facts of Garcetti as an example,230 a 
public that prioritizes high conviction rates is unlikely to hold a 
prosecutor’s office accountable for suppressing the speech of 
individual prosecutors that disrupts the smooth path to a conviction. 
Particularly when the speech raises concerns about the impact of 
government action on an unpopular minority, such as criminal 
defendants, electoral pressure is unlikely to provide an effective 
check on government burdening employees’ fundamental rights. 
Garcetti does leave intact First Amendment protections for 
employees who blow the whistle outside the workplace by reporting 
wrongdoing to enforcement agencies or the media, and Rosenthal 
suggests that these protections are sufficient to ensure political 
accountability.231 As Justice Stevens argued in his Garcetti dissent, 
excluding official-duty speech from First Amendment protection 
while protecting external whistleblowing creates a “perverse” rule 
that gives employees “an incentive to voice their concerns publicly 
before talking frankly to their superiors.”232 Contrary to Rosenthal’s 
claim, this incentive structure undermines managerial control and 
reduces political accountability by preventing government officials 
from receiving important information about the workings of their 
own agencies and denying them the opportunity to address problems 
internally in the first instance. 
In any case, political control over agency behavior is not solely 
about voting officials out of office. In Rosenthal’s model, voters 
simply observe the outcome of agency activities over a period of time 
and then respond periodically by voting their approval or 
disapproval.233 The First Amendment vision of democratic 
deliberation is richer than that. The purposes of government and the 
way it conducts its affairs should be a matter of ongoing public 
discussion, not merely passive observation. For example, Marvin 
Pickering’s speech would not have informed the electorate how to 
vote. The bond issue he wrote critically about had already been 
defeated.234 Rather, his speech was valuable because it raised 
important questions about what the funding priorities of the public 
schools were and should be. Reaction to and debate over particular 
government actions thus engage citizens in defining the priorities and 
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purposes of government and allow public officials to respond to these 
publicly expressed priorities on an ongoing basis. 
The connection to political accountability is more complex in the 
case of employee privacy than employee speech. On the one hand, 
the need for political accountability may reduce the public employee’s 
claims to privacy to the extent that some degree of transparency in 
government operations—including the communications and activities 
of government employees—is necessary to ensure accountability. This 
rationale may justify particular types of intrusions, limiting, for 
example, public employees’ expectations of privacy in 
communications made while carrying out public functions. On the 
other hand, the need for political accountability does not necessarily 
negate other distinct privacy interests that may be unrelated to 
agency operations. Depending upon their job responsibilities, 
employees’ claims to certain types of privacy, such as in their off-duty 
activities, purely personal communications, or sensitive information—
such as medical or financial information—do not necessarily conflict 
with the need for transparency to ensure political accountability.235 
At the same time, employee privacy is closely connected with 
employee speech rights.236 As privacy law scholars have explained, 
certain forms of privacy are essential to nurturing speech.237 
Surveillance of an individual’s activities and communications tends to 
chill the exploration of new ideas or the expression of unconventional 
or unpopular ideas.238 In the workplace context, speech that is most 
valuable is often oppositional, and therefore, some measure of 
privacy may be necessary before employees are willing to speak out in 
these ways.239 Such expression contributes to public debate despite or 
perhaps because of the fact that the public employer does not 
approve of it. At the same time, increased surveillance and violation 
of privacy norms may themselves be retaliatory responses directed 
against whistleblowers.240 Thus, to the extent that political 
accountability argues for protecting public employee speech, it also 
supports protecting some aspects of employee privacy. 
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The fact that the government is not just employer but also 
sovereign thus matters because public and private employers are 
subject to different control mechanisms. Private firms are exposed to 
market forces to a much greater extent, and those forces will often 
work to curb managerial abuses. In contrast, public employers are 
insulated from market pressures, but subject to political control. In 
order for mechanisms of political accountability to effectively rein in 
public officials, some protection of employee speech and privacy 
rights is required. Practices in the private sector, where market forces 
are more dominant, should not define what that constitutional 
minimum should be in the government workplace. 
CONCLUSION 
The conventional wisdom that public employees enjoy greater 
speech and privacy protections than workers in the private sector is in 
the process of being turned on its head. In a series of recent cases, the 
Supreme Court has increasingly relied on an analogy to private 
workplaces when interpreting public employees’ constitutional speech 
and privacy rights, and in doing so, has narrowed the scope of those 
rights. By relying on this analogy, the Court is implicitly importing 
into constitutional doctrine a presumption in favor of managerial 
prerogative. However, the arguments that might justify such a 
presumption in the private sector do not apply to the public 
employer. Because it is funded by the public to achieve publicly 
defined purposes, the government employer, unlike the private firm, 
cannot assert its own rights to property or autonomy to avoid 
compliance with constitutional norms. Similarly, the government 
agency cannot point to the existence of market mechanisms for 
controlling overreaching by the public manager, given the absence of 
the incentive structures used in the private sector to align managers’ 
interests with those of the firm. The importance of employee speech 
and privacy in ensuring the efficacy of mechanisms of public 
accountability thus justify a constitutionally guaranteed floor of 
protection for public employees’ speech and privacy, even though 
private sector employees may not enjoy a similar guarantee. 
